Working Paper


Paul O'Sullivan
J. Peter Neary



r d spillovers commitment research joint ventures export subsidies mathematical models commercial policy mathematical models research and development cooperative agreements dynamic consistency research industrial mathematical models strategic trade policy export subsidies

Beat 'em or join 'em? : export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets (1998)

Abstract This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and,because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government cancommit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.
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Full list of authors on original publication

Paul O'Sullivan, J. Peter Neary

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J. Peter Neary
University College Dublin
Total Publications: 79